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Evaluating anti-scheming training

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Science of Scheming

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Measuring Reward-Seeking via Contrastive Belief Updates

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21 July 2026

Table of Contents

Evaluating anti-scheming training

Language models trained with reinforcement learning may learn to optimize the grader’s judgment rather than the intended objective. This “reward-seeking” is difficult to measure because a model that pursues the grader’s judgment and one that pursues the intended objective behave identically whenever the grader rewards the intended behavior. We measure reward-seeking using Contrastive Synthetic Document Finetuning to change a model’s beliefs about what the grader rewards, putting those beliefs in conflict with what users or developers want, and measuring the rate at which the model adopts each party’s preferred behavior. Applied to intermediate checkpoints of a capabilities focused OpenAI o3 RL run, without safety training, we find that these checkpoints often side with grader preferences over those of users or developers on coding and alignment tasks. This tendency to side with the grader trends upward throughout RL training. For example, in an environment that forces a choice between keeping a promise to a supervisor and breaking it to complete the task, a late capabilities-focused o3 checkpoint breaks the promise 87% of the time when SDF documents say the grader rewards task completion, versus 9% when they say it rewards honesty (a choice its chain-of-thought often makes explicit). An earlier checkpoint is far less sensitive (40% vs. 24%). Our method also generalizes to reward-hacking models. A model organism trained to reward-hack (gpt-oss-120b) is more than twice as sensitive to grader preferences as the unmodified model, with the mean behavioral shift in favor of the grader rising from 33% to 86%. These results indicate that RL can increase reward-seeking over the course of training, producing models that may act against their developers’ intentions when they believe that doing so leads to higher reward.

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